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In his statement to the 19th Melanesian Spearhead Group (msg) leaders 
summit in Noumea, New Caledonia, on 21 June 2013, Solomon Islands 
Prime Minister Gordon Darcy Lilo couched his speech around the theme 
“msg: Our Place in the Sun in Oceania” and called on “Melanesians to rise 
up to the challenges facing their region and find their place amongst the 
nations of the world” (Lilo 2013). This was a bold statement, especially 
given the enormity of the social, political, and economic challenges that 
Melanesian countries face. Further, it is daring, given over two centuries 
of generally negative representations of Melanesian peoples and societ-
ies in Western discourses—negative representations that have over time 
been internalized by Pacific Islanders, including Melanesians, and used 
to perpetuate relationships with Melanesia that have racist, essentialist, 
and social evolutionary elements. The challenges for re-presenting Mela-
nesia are therefore not just socioeconomic but also epistemological. But 
Prime Minister Lilo’s call illustrates the fact that Melanesians have now 
appropriated the term “Melanesia” and are using it to challenge the nega-
tive representations—to “re-present” and “alter” the images of Melanesia 
as it vies for its “place in the sun.” Lilo’s statement therefore acknowl-
edges both the potential for economic developments in Melanesia due to 
its comparatively large population and land area and rich terrestrial and 
marine resources1 as well as the opportunity for people from this south-
western corner of Oceania to carve their place in the region and beyond.
In this essay, I examine the dominant representations of Melanesia as a 
place and Melanesians as peoples and how these have influenced under-
standings of and responses to contemporary developments in this subre-
gion.2 I begin with an overview of the discourses that influenced the map-
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ping of Oceania and the negative representations of Melanesians. These 
have, in turn, framed and influenced discourses about and relationships 
with Melanesia and Melanesians, including Melanesian perceptions of 
themselves and their relationships with others. 
Against this background, my focus is on how Melanesians have recently 
appropriated the term “Melanesia” and are using it in positive, empower-
ing, and progressive ways to mobilize, redefine, and re-present themselves. 
In the process, they have constructed a pan-Melanesian identity (or iden-
tities) that embraces and celebrates the subregion’s ethno-linguistic and 
cultural diversities. This is manifested through the concepts of “the Mela-
nesian Way” and “wantokism,”3 intergovernmental organizations such as 
the Melanesian Spearhead Group, the arts, and popular culture. Through 
all of these, Melanesians are “altering” the native and “re-presenting” 
what might be called the “ignoble savage.” This process and discourse 
constitute “Melanesianism.”
The Black Islands
The mapping and naming of Oceania as Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micro-
nesia has been extensively discussed and critiqued elsewhere (see, eg, 
Campbell 2010; Douglas 1998, 2010, 2011; Tcherkézoff 2003; Thomas 
1989). Here, I provide a brief overview of how the division and nam-
ing of Oceania was influenced, not only by Europeans’ search for Terra 
Australis or Zuytlandt (South land) but also by ideas of race that were 
dominant in Europe from the mid-eighteenth century or earlier (Douglas 
2010; Tcherkézoff 2003). 
French botanist and explorer Rear Admiral Jules-Sébastien-César 
Dumont d’Urville is the person most often credited for the tripartite divi-
sion of Oceania. His 1832 paper “Sur les ȋles du Grand Océan” (On 
the Islands of the Great Ocean) popularized the terms and the divisions 
(Dumont d’Urville 2003). However, variations of these terms and the 
meanings attached to them existed among many Europeans—especially 
aristocrats, scholars, navigators, explorers, and natural scientists—prior 
to the presentation and publication of Dumont d’Urville’s paper. He was, 
therefore, popularizing and reiterating terms and ideas that were prevalent 
in Europe at that time (Tcherkézoff 2003). 
This was not just a geographical mapping of the region; it was also 
a racialist mapping that reflected long-held ideas about race and social 
evolution (Tcherkézoff 2003; Douglas 2010). Bronwen Douglas discussed 
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how the “science of race” influenced how places in Oceania (and else-
where) were named and how people were categorized. She pointed to the 
“systematic efforts made in various branches of natural history—particu-
larly comparative anatomy, physiology, and zoology—to theorize physi-
cal difference between human groups as innate, morally and intellectually 
determinant, and possibly original” (Douglas 2008, 5). She clarified, how-
ever, that “the word ‘race’ (then a concrete genealogical term connoting 
a nation or people of common ancestry) was hardly used before the mid-
18th century, while the modern biological sense of a race (denoting per-
manent, innate, collective physical and mental differences) did not emerge 
until the 1770s” (Douglas 2010, 198). 
Serge Tcherkézoff, on the other hand, proposed a much longer history 
of European essentialist and negative representations of other races, espe-
cially black people, dating back to the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century 
enslaving of Africans by Spanish and Portuguese traders (2003). This 
was reinforced by the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century slave trade to 
America. 
In mapping Oceania, Melanesia was the only subregion named after 
the skin color of its inhabitants: the “black-skinned people” or “black 
islands.” The names “Polynesia” and “Micronesia” describe the geogra-
phy of the islands.4 The term “Melanesia” was deployed to invoke “black-
ness,” reflecting discourses about race in Europe that categorized human 
beings worldwide within a racial hierarchy that placed “white” or “Cau-
casian” people at the top and “black” people at the bottom (Douglas 
2008, 2010). Tcherkézoff stated that the tripartite division of Oceania 
“was not a simple matter of geography and map-making, but of race. . . .
long before Dumont d’Urville’s invention, the ‘black’ races were already 
labelled in the most disparaging terms. . . . The history of the contrast 
between Polynesia and Melanesia is not the story of a 19th-century French 
navigator, but the history of European ideas about ‘skin colours’, between 
the 16th and the 19th centuries” (Tcherkézoff 2003, 175, 195, 196). 
In Oceania, Dumont d’Urville identified two broad “varieties” of peo-
ple: “Among the many varieties of the human species that live on the vari-
ous islands of Oceania, all travellers, without exception, have reported two 
that differ very markedly from one another. Their many peculiar moral 
and physical features no doubt require us to regard them as two separate 
races” (2003, 164). He described Polynesians as “people of average height, 
with relatively pale olive-yellow complexions, sleek hair usually brown or 
black, a fairly regular build and well-proportioned limbs. . . . Moreover, 
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this race displays almost as much variety as the white race of Europe, that 
Duméril called Caucasian and Bory de Saint-Vincent, Japhetic” (Dumont 
d’Urville 2003, 164). The group that he called Melanesians, on the other 
hand, “comprises people with very dark, often sooty, skins, sometimes 
almost as black as that of the Kaffirs, and curly, fuzzy, fluffy but seldom 
woolly hair. Their features are disagreeable, their build is uneven and their 
limbs are often frail and deformed. . . . Nevertheless, there is as much 
variety in skin colour, build and features among the black people of Ocea-
nia as among the numerous nations who live on the African continent 
and make up the race that most authors have referred to as Ethiopian” 
(Dumont d’Urville 2003, 164).
Europeans—as demonstrated in Dumont d’Urville’s writings—drew a 
parallel between the physical features, morality, and social organizations 
of Melanesians and Africans, implying that the dark-skinned people of 
Oceania were similar to and therefore should be treated in the same way 
as dark-skinned people elsewhere. 
To illustrate this point, let me turn to our neighbor Australia, a place 
where race relations were of great concern by the mid-eighteenth century 
and continue to be an issue today (see Wolfe 2006; Anderson 2003). Writ-
ing about people of mixed descent in Australia, historian Henry Reynolds 
argued that racial categories that had already taken root in Europe and 
North America were transmitted to Australia and helped define race rela-
tions there. Reynolds described how, at the first Commonwealth Parlia-
ment meeting in 1901, “members and Senators agreed about the centrality 
of race. They agreed that there was a demonstrable hierarchy of races with 
the northwest Europeans, the Nordics or Caucasians at the top and the 
Africans, Melanesians and Aborigines at the bottom” (2005, 85). 
In this racialist mapping, the “Oceanic Negroes,” which included Aus-
tralian Aborigines and those from the southwestern Pacific, were placed 
in the same category as black people from Africa, who by then had long 
been subjected to European-perpetrated slavery in the New World. This 
categorization reflected discourses that influenced European interactions 
with the rest of the world. Notions of racial hierarchy and references to 
“black-skinned people” as the most primitive of human races were, its 
proponents argued, supported by science (Douglas 2008; Ballard 2008). 
One popular pseudo-scientific approach was phrenology, which involved 
the measuring of human skulls and brains to determine the place of their 
owners in the racial hierarchy. In these studies, the Oceanic Negroes—
like their African “relatives”—were placed low in the hierarchy (Rochette 
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2003). In a lecture in 1819, the British biologist Sir William Lawrence 
asserted that the distinction of color between white and black was not 
more striking
than the pre-eminence of the former in moral feelings and mental endow-
ments. . . . The later . . . indulge, almost universally, in disgusting debauchery 
and sensuality, and display gross selfishness, indifference to the pains and plea-
sures of others, insensibility to beauty of form, order and harmony, and an 
almost entire want of what we comprehend altogether under the expression 
of elevated sentiments, manly virtues and moral feeling. The hideous savages 
of Van Diemen’s Land [Tasmania], of New Holland [Australia], New Guinea, 
and some neighbouring islands, the Negroes of Congo and some other parts 
exhibit the most disgusting moral as well as physical portrait of man. (quoted 
in Reynolds 2005, 86)
Reynolds quoted French aristocrat and novelist Joseph Arthur De 
Gobineau as saying that the Oceanic Negroes “had the special privilege 
of providing the ‘most ugly, and degraded and repulsive specimens of the 
race’ that seemed to have been created to provide a link between man and 
the brute” (Reynolds 2005, 68). Similarly, in dividing Oceania into Poly-
nesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia, Dumont d’Urville, like his predeces-
sors, emphasized skin color. He identified Melanesians—which included 
the inhabitants of New Holland (Australia) and Van Diemen’s Land (Tas-
mania)—as “more or less black in colour, with curly, fuzzy or sometimes 
nearly woolly hair, flat noses, wide mouths and unpleasant features, and 
their limbs are often very frail and seldom well shaped. The women are 
even more hideous than the men, especially those who have suckled chil-
dren, as their breasts immediately become flaccid and droopy, and the lit-
tle freshness that they owed to youth vanishes at once” (Dumont d’Urville 
2003, 169). 
The racialist mapping of Oceania was also influenced by pseudo-evo-
lutionary ideas about cultures and sociopolitical organizations. Dumont 
d’Urville, for example, stated that Polynesians “are often organised into 
nations and sometimes powerful monarchies.” This was in contrast to 
Melanesians who “are organised into tribes or clans of varying size, but 
very seldom into nations, and their institutions are far from attaining the 
degree of refinement that can sometimes be found among people of the 
copper-skinned race” (Dumont d’Urville2003, 164). The measure of the 
“development” of a society—and therefore race—was according to how 
similar to or different from European forms of government it was. Con-
sequently, the absence of centralized authority and the relative egalitar-
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ian nature of societies in the southwestern Pacific and among indigenous 
Australians implied social deficiencies and therefore inferiority. Indige-
nous Australians were seen as the lowest in the social and racial hierarchy 
because of their nomadic hunter-gatherer societies (Ballard 2008; Reyn-
olds 2005). 
Another important aspect of this discussion is the link between race 
and gender. The difference between Polynesia and Melanesia was based 
not only on the color of people’s skin or the relative “development” of 
their sociopolitical organizations but also on how women were viewed 
and how they were seen to relate to both indigenous men and European 
strangers. Margaret Jolly suggested that, long before Dumont d’Urville’s 
1832 paper, Europeans made strongly contrasting judgments between the 
women of Polynesia and Melanesia in terms of beauty, sexual allure and 
access, work, and status vis-à-vis indigenous men (2012). While Polyne-
sian women were often portrayed as “dusky maidens” (Tamaira 2010), 
Melanesian women were portrayed in derogatory terms. This “gendering 
of race” affects perception of Melanesian women and their place in con-
temporary societies (Jolly 2012).
Given European attitudes, it is therefore no surprise that the “dark-
est” of the Pacific Islanders were identified by the color of their skin, 
rather than by the geographical characteristics of the places where they 
lived. Right from the beginning, the term “Melanesia” was impregnated 
with racialist overtones. Papua New Guinean scholar Regis Tove Stella 
discussed how race was used in European colonial discourse to describe 
and represent Papua New Guineans as inferior to Europeans and other 
Pacific Islanders, partly because of their darker skin. He stated, “Colonial 
discourse produced and circulated knowledge and imagery that regularly 
depicted Papua New Guineans as inferior and subordinate, portraying 
them in positions of subjection, savagery, and powerlessness in accordance 
with the widespread operation of the discourse” (Stella 2007, 21). This is 
true of depiction of the rest of Melanesia, as discussed above. This essen-
tialist and racialist view of Melanesia set the tone for how the peoples and 
cultures from Melanesia were represented in the centuries that followed 
colonization. 
Islands of Ignoble Savages
European images of Oceania were also influenced by the concept of the 
“Noble Savage,” which glorified a “natural life” that was seen as uncor-
rupted by civilization and therefore represented humans’ innate goodness 
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(Ellingston 2001). The portrayal of Pacific Islanders as “noble savages” 
was influenced largely by the accounts of European explorers like James 
Cook and Louis Antoine de Bougainville, who had documented and shared 
their encounters with South Seas peoples and places, especially Tahitian 
and Marquesan peoples and landscapes (Jolly 1997). I have often won-
dered how the view of Pacific Islanders as “noble savages” would have 
developed had it been based on European encounters with my ancestors 
from the Solomon Islands or with those from other parts of Melanesia. 
Perhaps the descriptor of the “savage” would have shifted from “noble” 
to “ignoble.”
Scholarly enterprises that developed with European and North Ameri-
can higher education also contributed to the construction and perpetu-
ation of the negative representations of Melanesia. Central to this was 
cultural anthropology, a discipline that pioneered scholarly descriptions 
of Melanesian places, peoples, and cultures. While this field of study has 
contributed to knowledge about Melanesia, it also added to distortions 
and misunderstandings and perpetuated the racialized division of Ocea-
nia. Epeli Hau‘ofa commented on the role of anthropology in perpetuat-
ing what he called “distorted” images of Melanesia: 
after decades of anthropological field research in Melanesia we have come 
up only with pictures of people who fight, compete, trade, pay bride-prices, 
engage in rituals, invent cargo cults, copulate, and sorcerise each other. There 
is hardly anything in our literature to indicate whether these people have any 
such sentiments as love, kindness, consideration, altruism, and so on. We can-
not tell from our ethnographic writings whether they have a sense of humour. 
We know little about their systems of morality, specifically their ideas of the 
good and the bad, and their philosophies. (Hau‘ofa 2008, 6)
Hau‘ofa took issue with the tendency to describe Melanesian polities as 
“underdeveloped” and “backward” compared to “advanced” Polynesia. 
He argued that anthropological description “denies that traditional Mela-
nesian leaders have any genuine interest in the welfare of their people and 
insists that their public actions are all motivated purely by selfishness.” 
He went on to say that this kind of ethnographic work is “erroneous” 
and “an invidious pseudo-evolutionary comparison between the ‘devel-
oped’ Polynesian polities and the ‘underdeveloped’ Melanesian ones.” 
He decried the fact that Europeans have long romanticized Polynesians 
and denigrated Melanesians, and he warned that this kind of anthropol-
ogy “has the potential of bolstering the long-standing Polynesian racism 
against Melanesians” (Hau‘ofa 2008, 6).
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Hau‘ofa was referring, in particular, to the work of social anthropolo-
gists who often describe Melanesian polities as comparatively smaller and 
ethno-linguistically diverse with no “centralized” authority. In discussing 
the difference between Melanesia and Polynesia, Marshall Sahlins, for 
example, stated that “the Polynesians were to become famous for elabo-
rate forms of rank and chieftainship, whereas most Melanesian societies 
broke off advance on this front at more rudimentary levels” (1963, 286). 
He went on to say that, “measurable along several dimensions, the contrast 
between developed Polynesian and underdeveloped Melanesian polities is 
immediately striking for differences in scale” (Sahlins 1963, 289). Such 
descriptions resonate with early European writings and invoke pseudo-
evolutionary comparisons. They are based on the fact that Melanesian 
polities did not resemble the models of the centralized state that were 
established in Europe and exported to the rest of the world through colo-
nialism. Polynesian societies, on the other hand, had hierarchical chiefly 
systems that resembled the feudal systems in Europe. Furthermore, by the 
1800s, centralized “governments” had been created in parts of Polynesia. 
The establishment of monarchs in Hawai‘i, Tahiti, and Tonga was often 
pointed to as a sign of “development” in Polynesian social organization 
(see, eg, discussion in Howe 1984, 59–65). In Fiji, the rise and establish-
ment of Bau as the central power was never complete because Ratu Seru 
Epenisa Cakobau did not have control over all of Fiji (Lal 1992). The per-
ception that having large centralized institutions—in the form of states—
was the best way of organizing societies contributed to the denigration of 
Melanesian sociopolitical organizations.
The descriptions of Melanesian sociopolitical organizations as “under-
developed” and “backward” were also due to Europeans’ inability to 
relate to and understand the complexities of Melanesian societies. For 
instance, the Kula Ring in Papua New Guinea entailed complex inter-
actions among peoples from different language groups, involving trade, 
politics, ceremonial exchanges, and social relationships that held these 
societies together and survived for thousands of years (Malinowski 1920; 
Ziegler 1990). Another example is the shell-money trade between the peo-
ple of Langalanga Lagoon on Malaita in Solomon Islands and Bougain-
ville as well as other parts of island Papua New Guinea. This continues 
today, largely outside of the purview of the state and despite the trade 
and immigration regulations that the governments of Solomon Islands and 
Papua New Guinea impose (Guo 2006; Connell 1977). Perhaps Melane-
sian societies baffled early European visitors because they were vastly dif-
ferent and unfamiliar. Europeans therefore employed pseudo-evolutionary 
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ideas that placed European social organization at the top along with those 
that resembled them and those unfamiliar and dissimilar at the bottom. 
Such attitudes are often reflected—albeit implicitly—in contemporary 
discussions of social, political, and economic developments in Melanesia. 
In the last three decades, Melanesia has been portrayed predominantly as 
a place of conflicts, political instabilities, and poor social and economic 
development. The diversity of cultures and languages is often presented as 
a problem rather than as a rich cultural heritage. Ethno-linguistic diversity, 
it seems, does not fit into the idea of a homogenizing world, where collec-
tive “imagined communities”—to reference Benedict Anderson (1991)—
and national identities are normative and regarded as more “civilized.” 
Political scientists often describe Melanesian states as “weak” and “fail-
ing” and as part of an “arc of instability” that stretches from Indonesia 
to Fiji (May 2003; Duncan and Chand 2002). Furthermore, these states 
were often referenced as the primary contributors to what some called 
the “Africanisation of the Pacific” (Reilly 2000). This viewpoint invokes 
a perceived connection between Africa and Oceania—especially Melane-
sia—that was made in early European writings. It implies that these con-
nections were “natural” and the same challenges were expected of black 
people, whether they were in Africa or Oceania. Jon Fraenkel (2004) and 
David Chappell (2005) have challenged Ben Reilly’s “Africanisation of the 
Pacific” thesis, arguing that it made broad and erroneous generalizations 
and did not fully consider the colonial histories and experiences that have 
contributed to Oceania’s contemporary challenges. 
Political scientists explain contemporary issues and developments in 
Melanesia almost exclusively vis-à-vis Western ideas and models of gov-
ernance. They measure the failures and successes of Melanesian societies 
by using Western criteria, often in the guise of universalizing theories of 
governance. This is usually done without reference to the ways that Mela-
nesians organized themselves in their own terms and how these strate-
gies have kept their societies surviving for thousands of years. Terence 
Wesley-Smith pointed to this problem in his discussion of how the concept 
of the state is exported and promoted as if it were the most natural and 
appropriate institution for organizing all human societies, including those 
in Melanesia (2008). The state is often presented as unproblematic, or at 
least taken as “given” in ways that ignore the violent history of the devel-
opment of the Western states. 
The negative representation of Melanesians—and hence the construc-
tion of the “ignoble savage”—is found not only in academic research and 
writings but in visual images as well. I am often troubled by images of 
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Melanesians that are framed and hung on the walls of university build-
ings. To me they look uncomfortable, trapped in time for the entertain-
ment, curiosity, and amusement of those who walk the corridors. When I 
first went to the Australian National University, I found that the only pic-
ture of bare-breasted women on the walls of the Coombs Building was one 
of Solomon Islanders. I have written about that elsewhere (Kabutaulaka 
1997). When I joined the East-West Center in Honolulu, I noticed that the 
only pictures of half-naked people on the walls of Burns Hall were those 
of people from Tanna in Vanuatu. These images were on the third floor, 
where the Pacific Islands Development Program—where I once worked—
is located. As I walked along the corridor, I passed the half-naked Tanna 
people and then came to pictures of Micronesians who were dressed and 
represented in studio poses, as though they had been liberated from sav-
agery, unlike the Melanesians at the other end of the hallway. I often won-
dered what those people in the pictures might have been thinking as they 
stared at me from their framed existence. They probably wondered why I 
was walking along the corridor and not framed and hung on the wall with 
the rest of them. Perhaps I am framed in a different way—still stuck in the 
racialized map of Oceania constructed by early Europeans and sustained 
by contemporary discourses. 
This kind of stasis is what Homi Bhabha, in his discussion of representa-
tion in colonial discourses, referred to as the “dependence on the concept 
of ‘fixity’ in the ideological construction of otherness” (1994, 66). The 
display of colonial subjects, or “others,” as naturally and permanently 
fixed in a particular time and state-of-being in turn naturalizes and justi-
fies their domination (see Hall 1997; Spurr 1993). The constant represen-
tation of Melanesians in books and in paintings on the walls of academic 
buildings as well as museums as naked or half naked posing in jungles or 
villages portrays them as naturally trapped in a particular state-of-being 
and unchanging. These “ignoble savages” are therefore “backward” com-
pared to the West (and the rest of Oceania), which is constantly changing 
and “progressing.” 
Negative representations of Melanesia are also found in popular writ-
ings. For example, in writing about his travels through Solomon Islands in 
1911, Jack London had little good to say about the island group. In fact, 
he stated, “If I were a king, the worst punishment I could inflict on my 
enemies would be to banish them to the Solomons. On second thought, 
king or no king, I don’t think I’d have the heart to do it” (London 2003, 
178). Travel writer Paul Theroux, writing in the 1990s, said that he found 
the Solomons to be “the most savage islands in the Pacific” (1992, 155). In 
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his book The Happy Isles of Oceania, Theroux had a go at nearly all the 
Pacific Islands, but he reserved his most horrendous comments for Mela-
nesians, describing Solomon Islanders in Honiara as “among the scariest-
looking people I had ever seen in my life” (1992, 155). For Fiji, Theroux 
made a distinction between the people of eastern Fiji and those that he 
referred to as “Melanesian Fijians.” He wrote that “the Lau Group is one 
of the pretty little star clusters in the universe of Oceania. Melanesian Fiji 
is another story. Fiji is like the world you thought you left behind—full 
of political perversity, racial fear, economic woes, and Australian tourists 
looking for inexpensive salad bowls” (Theroux 1992, 219). While such 
descriptions may raise eyebrows, they also appeal to European curios-
ity about the savage Melanesians. It is no surprise that Theroux’s book 
became a New York Times best seller—it fed the Western imagination 
about Melanesian “backwardness” and savagery. 
The media also contribute to the “ignoble savage” representation of 
Melanesia. In 2007, a British television company produced a three-part 
documentary series titled Meet the Natives. The producers promoted this 
as “reverse anthropology,” in which “natives” would be taken to metro-
politan cities and their interactions with the peoples and cultures of the 
West would be filmed. The first task was to find the “native”—and, of 
course, where did they look but Melanesia. In the first part of the series, 
five men from Tanna in Vanuatu were taken to London and filmed as 
they interacted with “English peoples and cultures.” Although I have not 
watched the series, I found the idea of “reverse anthropology” troubling.5 
On 8 September 2007, the British newspaper The Independent carried a 
story titled, “Strange Island: Pacific Tribesmen Come to Study Britain” 
(Adams 2007). In this article, the five men from Tanna had no voice; they 
were merely the exotic objects of media commentary. 
After the London episode of Meet the Natives was aired, I received 
an e-mail from the producers asking me to facilitate the production of a 
sequel to the documentary. This time they wanted to take men from the 
Weather Coast of Guadalcanal in Solomon Islands (where I come from), 
and especially the followers of the Moro Movement, to New York. I seri-
ously considered their request, knowing that many of my wantok would 
love to go to New York, even if they had no clue where it was or what they 
were required to do. However, after careful consideration, I refused to 
facilitate the project and e-mailed the producers saying that I was unable 
to help. I saw the project not as “reverse anthropology” but as simply a 
relocation of the “native” or the “ignoble savage” who continues to be an 
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object of Western curiosity. This time, however, the “native” was being 
placed in an unfamiliar environment and gazed at through television cam-
eras and screens. I could imagine English families in their living rooms, 
gazing at the television and commenting on the “natives,” the faraway 
places they came from, how they must be fascinated by English culture—
and I thought about how all of this would contribute yet again to the 
production of denigrating “knowledge” about Melanesians. It made my 
“intellectual spirit” quiver. 
(When I was approached, the mischievous side of me—which makes 
up quite a bit of me—was tempted to facilitate the project. I thought that 
since they didn’t know what I looked like, it would be fun if I could fly 
home, dress up in kabilato (bark cloth) like the “native” they wanted to 
see, and get myself recruited as part of the “delegation” to New York. I 
thought that it would be amusing if, in the middle of filming, I would start 
discussions about the politics of representation, demand to be taken to 
Broadway or to the United Nations headquarters, and ask to be wined and 
dined at the most expensive restaurants. I would suddenly break out of the 
native binary and run amok in New York. Perhaps that part of the series 
could be titled, “Native Runs Amok in New York.” However, in the end, 
the sensible side of me prevailed and I dropped the idea.) 
While my focus in this essay thus far has been on European representa-
tions, it is important to note that the “ignoble savage” images of Melane-
sian have spread beyond the European imagination and become entrenched 
among non-Europeans as well. To illustrate this, let me recount an event 
that occurred in Canberra in the late 1990s when I was a PhD student at 
the Australian National University (anu). One afternoon, I was in a bus 
with John Naitoro—another Solomon Islander who was also working on 
his PhD at the university—on our way to anu housing at Hughes, a sub-
urb of Canberra where we lived. We sat at the back of the bus chattering 
away in Solomon Islands pijin. Next to us was a black man, whom we 
later learned was from Somalia. After listening to us for a while, he asked, 
“Are you from Papua New Guinea?”
“Yes, we are from Papua New Guinea,” John quickly responded before 
I could say anything. 
The man was quiet for a while and then asked, “Do you eat people in 
Papua New Guinea?” I was shocked.
“Yes, we eat people,” John quickly responded. 
“But that was long time ago, right?” the man asked, after a moment of 
silence. 
122 the contemporary pacific • 27:1 (2015)
“No, we still eat people,” John quickly answered with a serious expres-
sion on his face. I looked at him and then at the man, wondering where 
this conversation was going. 
After a while and as though to assure himself of his safety, the man 
asked, “But you only eat white people, right?” 
“No, we eat black people as well,” John said looking straight at him 
and more seriously than before. The man stood up and went to the front 
of the bus.
That incident set me thinking about where and how an African had 
gotten the idea that Papua New Guineans in Canberra in the late 1990s 
could be cannibals. Perhaps he thought that you could take the man out of 
cannibal land, but not cannibalism out of the man. I also wondered what 
he would have asked if we had told him that we were from Tahiti. Perhaps 
he would have asked if in Tahiti we danced tamure all day, ate from abun-
dant breadfruit trees, and made love under coconut trees. I also wondered 
why John responded to him in the way he did. John said to me afterward, 
“Hem na wat fo talem long pipol karage olsem” (That’s what you say to 
people who are ignorant like that).
The “ignoble Melanesian savage” exists not only in European and Afri-
can minds but also in Pacific Islander minds. The negative representation 
of Melanesians—and darker-skinned people more generally—has, to some 
extent, been internalized by Pacific Islanders, including Melanesians. This 
is reflected in the languages, perceptions, and relationships among Pacific 
Islanders. This topic is not usually discussed openly because it is sensitive 
and people fear being labeled “racist” or causing unsettling waves in our 
wan solwara.6 
Let me take the risk and raise some of these languages and perceptions 
here. In Sāmoa, for example, black people (including Melanesians) are 
commonly referred to as mea uli. Uli is the word for “black,” and one of 
the most common meanings of mea is “thing.” Hence, one could argue that 
the use of the term mea uli (either consciously or unconsciously) strips the 
black person of his or her humanity and reduces him or her to a “thing”—
mea uli. In March 2009, there was a debate in the Samoa Observer fol-
lowing the use of the term mea uli to refer to the then newly elected first 
black president in the United States, Barack Obama. One of the contribu-
tors suggested the use of the term tagata uli, which literally means “black 
man,” and taine uli as appropriate for “black woman” (Samoa Observer, 
23 March 2009).7 In Tongan, a black person may be referred to as ‘uli‘uli 
(black) or, more rudely, me‘a ‘uli (black thing). As ‘uli is also the word for 
“dirty,” one wonders whether black people are considered dirty. 
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In June 2010, I presented a version of this paper at the University of 
the South Pacific (usp) as a way of starting conversations about the per-
ceptions associated with the divisions of Oceania and how Melanesians 
are represented. The usp student newspaper, Wan Solwara, published a 
story about my presentation and comments from usp students and faculty. 
This was later reprinted in the Auckland University of Technology Pacific 
Media Centre’s online publication, Pacific.Scoop. The comments by two 
prominent Pacific Islander scholars were insightful and important in this 
conversation. Education Professor Konai Helu Thaman was reported 
to have said that “referring to black-skinned people as ‘uli or ‘uli‘uli is 
purely for descriptive purposes and not meant to be offensive.” She said, 
“When Tongans say ‘uli‘uli it does not mean that they are superior, being 
a Tongan. They are just describing the person, but if there is a feeling that 
whoever is ‘uli‘uli is black and is compared to white, then that is problem-
atic.” Historian Morgan Tuimaleali‘ifano explained that the expression 
mea uli in Samoan meant black people without negative connotations. But 
he added that there were people who put “value” behind the term (Pacific.
Scoop 2010). 
Epeli Hau‘ofa, who was born of Tongan missionary parents in Papua 
New Guinea and spent his early years in that country, provided a slightly 
different perspective. In an interview with Nicholas Thomas in 2006, 
Hau‘ofa stated: “My upbringing in Melanesia was very important. I am 
extremely sensitive to Polynesian cultures and the contemporary situation 
and modernization, but they are rather dominant. Always, when I went to 
Tonga, I found that the way Polynesians feel and think about Melanesians 
[is] rather appalling. It’s racist. There is a feeling of superiority. Because 
part of me is Melanesian, I’m always trying to go beyond that divide” 
(Thomas 2012, 126). 
Polynesian views of Melanesians were perhaps influenced also by the 
experiences of Polynesian missionaries. The eastern Pacific was the first 
to have extensive contact with Europeans and to convert to Christianity. 
Polynesian missionaries were subsequently recruited to work in Melane-
sia. Sione Latukefu provided an insightful discussion of Polynesian and 
Fijian missionaries’ interactions with Papua New Guineans and Solomon 
Islanders, as well as with their European counterparts. In commenting on 
the relation between Polynesian missionaries and Melanesians, Latukefu 
wrote, “The Tongans and Samoans had no doubt whatsoever of their 
physical, mental and cultural superiority to the Melanesians, an attitude 
that was reinforced by their role of ‘bringing light to the darkness of Mel-
anesia’” (1978, 98). He noted that Samoan missionaries found it most 
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 difficult to adjust, attributing this to the fact “that Samoans had (and still 
have) a tremendous pride in their culture, the fa‘a Samoa ‘Samoan tra-
dition.’ Believing themselves to be the cream of the Pacific, they tended to 
look down on others, particularly the Papua New Guineans and Solomon 
Islanders” (Latukefu 1978, 98). This, Latukefu suggested, might also have 
been influenced by the fact that Samoan pastors were treated as special at 
home and therefore expected that treatment elsewhere. The situation was 
different with Fijian missionaries, whom Latukefu described as “closer to 
the local people. Since they were Melanesians themselves, there were few 
barriers between them and the people, either racially or culturally. Mar-
riage between Fijian missionaries and local women was quite common, 
especially among missionaries who became widowers during their term of 
service, but marriage between Samoans and Tongans and local people was 
extremely rare” (Latukefu 1978, 98). I raise this not to accuse Tongans 
and Samoans (and other Pacific Islanders) of being racist toward Mela-
nesians but rather to highlight and begin examinations and discussions 
about how we Pacific Islanders have internalized the racial divisions of 
Oceania and the prejudices associated with their European constructions. 
This signifies the extent of the impact of colonial discourses and its role in 
preventing us from achieving the Oceanic identity that Hau‘ofa aspired to 
in his essay “Our Sea of Islands” (2008).
It is important to note that prejudice toward darker-skinned people also 
exists among Melanesians. Relatively lighter-skinned Melanesians some-
times speak in disparaging ways about darker-skinned Melanesians and 
associate them with more “savagery” because of the color of their skin. 
In Solomon Islands, for example, a month prior to independence in July 
1978, the government newspaper published a poem titled “West Wind,” 
written by a man from Malaita, in which he described those from the West-
ern Solomon Islands, who are generally darker than other Solomon Island-
ers, as “Black and ugly, proud and lazy” (News Drum, 9 June 1978).8 The 
poem incited debates (News Drum, 23 June 1978) and fueled sentiments 
for the Western Solomons to secede from the rest of the country (Premdas, 
Steeves, and Larmour 1984). The issue was deemed so serious that the 
author of the poem was charged with sedition (News Drum, 8 Sept 1978).
Consequently, in order for the discussions—especially among Pacific 
Islanders—to transcend the colonial binaries and establish and reinforce 
the trans-Oceanic identities that Hau‘ofa talked about, it is important that 
Pacific Islanders acknowledge how these binaries have influenced how 
we perceive and relate to each other. This is a discussion that might be 
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 uncomfortable, but it is one that is important and that we must not shy 
away from. 
Some have proposed the need to shift beyond these geographical and 
racial binaries and to emphasize the interconnections between Island-
ers. This, it was envisaged, would foster the construction of pan-Oceanic 
identities and connections that had existed prior to European contact—
or, if they hadn’t existed, that should be established because we belong 
to wan solwara. The late Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, prime minister and 
president of Fiji, for example, started this by proposing the concept of the 
“Pacific Way.” He was credited for coining and first articulating the term 
at a United Nations General Assembly meeting in October 1970. In that 
address, Ratu Mara used the term to refer specifically to Fiji’s smooth 
transition from colonial rule to independence as reflecting a “Pacific Way” 
that was consensual and peaceful (Mara 1997, 238). However, the term 
has since been used broadly as anticolonial and representing Oceania as 
a region with similar cultures that is politically united, can address issues 
through collective diplomacy, and invokes a Pan-Oceania identity (Cro-
combe 1976). But, as Stephanie Lawson pointed out, the term also reflects 
Polynesian values, especially Ratu Mara’s aristocratic background, more 
than those of Melanesia and Micronesia (Lawson 2010, 2013). 
Epeli Hau‘ofa was also a proponent of pan-Oceanic identities. He high-
lighted how pan-Oceanic connections transcend national and subregional 
boundaries, arguing that the ocean connects rather than divides the Pacific 
Islands. He described Oceania prior to European contact as “a large world 
in which peoples and cultures moved and mingled, unhindered by bound-
aries of the kind erected much later by imperial powers. From one island 
to another they sailed to trade and to marry, thereby expanding social 
networks for greater flows of wealth. They travelled to visit relatives in a 
wide variety of natural and cultural surroundings, to quench their thirst 
for adventure, and even to fight and dominate” (Hau‘ofa 2008, 33).
While I agree with Hau‘ofa’s proposal to strengthen our trans-Oceanic 
connections and identities, it must be noted that national and subregional 
boundaries persist and have become “realities” for most Pacific Island-
ers. In fact, while scholars have been engaged in critical debate about 
and deconstructions of the tripartite divisions—conversations that are 
important and must be encouraged—there is relatively less discussion 
about how the terms “Polynesia,” “Micronesia,” and “Melanesia” have 
taken on lives of their own, appropriated by Pacific Islanders and used 
to frame their identities and influence relationships among themselves 
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and with  others. Political and cultural organizations in the region have 
adopted these names, indicating that Pacific Islanders have taken on these 
terms and used them for their own purposes. Examples of these include 
the  Melanesian Spearhead Group, the Micronesian Chief Executives Sum-
mit, and the Polynesian Leaders Group. On one hand, these subregional 
organizations could be viewed as perpetuating the colonial and essentialist 
divisions of Oceania. Alternatively, they could be seen as appropriating 
these terms and using them to construct new, useful, and empowering 
identities. Melanesians, as will be discussed in the next section, have cer-
tainly taken the term “Melanesia” and built an identity around it. 
Melanesianism & Alter-Natives
While negative representations of Melanesia linger in the shadows of 
scholarly and popular discourses, Melanesians are proactively trying to 
shed the “ignoble savage” image and aspire for “a place in the sun.” They 
have appropriated the term “Melanesia” for self-identification and are 
“altering” the “native,” creating “alter-natives.” They are showing that 
Melanesians have complex experiences and cultures that are rooted in cen-
turies of traditions while at the same time adapting to new and dynamic 
futures that draw from within Melanesia and beyond. As Lawson stated, 
“Melanesia has acquired a positive meaning for many of those to whom it 
applies, providing a basis for the assertion of an identity that is confident 
and imbued with pride, thus clearly transcending its origins and establish-
ing a new ‘reality’” (2013, 21). 
Since the 1970s, Melanesian political and intellectual leaders have 
attempted to construct and assert a collective Melanesian identity (or 
identities). Lawson provided a detailed discussion of the complex postco-
lonial histories and politics behind the idea of “Melanesia” and the con-
struction of “Melanesianism” (2013). This was a reaction to the negative 
representations of Melanesia that started with the mapping of Oceania in 
the mid-eighteenth century and persisted through scholarly and popular 
discourses with mainly Euro-American and Australian origins. It was also 
a reaction to Melanesians’ perception that Fiji (under Ratu Mara) and the 
Polynesian countries that gained independence earlier were dominating 
regional organizations such as the Pacific Islands Forum (pif) and dis-
courses about and representations of Oceania (Lawson 2013). 
But the idea of “Melanesia” and the process of “Melanesianism” were 
influenced not only by past experiences but also by the awareness of future 
potentials. I will return to discussions of the future potentials later. Here, 
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let me explain what I mean by “Melanesianism.” This is a concept and 
a discourse that creates an “imagined community” (Anderson 1983) and 
invokes shared values—both imagined and real—that are fluid, dynamic, 
and constantly reinvented through ongoing tok stori (conversations) and 
shared experiences. Melanesianism is therefore a process rather than an 
ideology or a state of being. It is a discourse about an “imagined commu-
nity” that takes form and becomes “real” through pan-Melanesian con-
nections that are manifested in the idea of “Melanesia” and in organiza-
tions that forge political, economic, and cultural cooperation. A common 
pidgin language that is spoken in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, 
and Vanuatu reinforces Melanesianism. 
Melanesianism is also manifested and expressed through parallel 
and overlapping concepts such as the “Melanesian Way,” “Melanesian 
socialism,” and “wantokism.” Stephanie Lawson (2013), Ralph Premdas 
(1987), and Michael Howard (1983) provided detailed examinations and 
analyses of the history and politics of the Melanesian Way and Mela-
nesian socialism. I do not need to repeat those here except to point out 
that Bernard Narokobi, the Papua New Guinean intellectual and public 
servant who popularized the term “Melanesian Way,” never provided a 
precise definition for the term. He argued that it would be futile to attempt 
to define “a total cosmic vision of life” (Narokobi 1980, 8). Since then, 
nobody that I know of has attempted to concisely define the “Melanesian 
Way.” Perhaps it is this ambiguity and the fact that it was never framed 
and confined by specific definitions that have enabled Melanesianism to 
evolve and adapt in the last four decades, encompassing new experiences 
and innovative and creative forms of expressions. Melanesianism is rooted 
in and draws strength from the past but is not confined by it. It exists and 
is “real” because it is talked about, lived, and experienced, not because it 
is defined. 
Furthermore, Melanesianism, as expressed through the Melanesian 
Way, embraces the subregion’s ethno-linguistic and cultural diversities.9 
Narokobi suggested that the Melanesian Way does not necessarily imply 
a single Melanesian identity. Rather, it is a celebration of Melanesia’s 
diversity and the fact that such diversity is a source of strength rather 
than of problem and weakness (Narokobi 1980). This view advocates 
harnessing and celebrating the common worldviews that one often finds 
woven amid the diversities. Western scholarship and popular representa-
tions of Melanesia have tended to focus on and emphasize the differences, 
rather than the similarities. But in an attempt to assert Melanesianism, 
emerging Melanesian elites often use slogans such as “unity in diversity” 
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to mobilize for decolonization (Scheyvens 1988) and invoke an idea of a 
community founded on the basis of shared diversities. Francis Saemala, 
for example, discussed how the foundations of decolonization and post-
colonial nation building in Solomon Islands were built on “uniting the 
diversity” (1982). 
But translating the idea of “unity in diversity” into reality is challeng-
ing, as we have seen in violent events such as the Bougainville Crisis and 
the Solomon Islands conflicts that emphasized the differences, rather than 
the unity. The causes of these conflicts, however, lie in a variety of socio-
economic and political issues that have more recent history, rather than 
primordial ethno-linguistic differences (Regan 1998; Moore 2004). The 
causes of the Fiji coups in 1987, 2000, and 2006 are also more complex 
than simply an expression of the differences between the iTaukei (indig-
enous Fijians) and the descendants of Indian migrants (Tarte 2009).
Melanesian Spearhead Group
The political manifestation of Melanesianism was the establishments of 
the Melanesian Spearhead Group (msg) in 1986, following informal dis-
cussions by the heads of the governments of Papua New Guinea, Solo-
mon Islands, and Vanuatu and a representative of the Kanak Socialist 
National Liberation Front (flnks) in Goroka, PNG. The “Agreed Prin-
ciples of Cooperation Among the Independent States in Melanesia” was 
signed in March 1988. The formal “Agreement Establishing the msg” and 
the “msg Constitution” were not signed until March 2007, followed by 
the opening of the msg Secretariat headquarters in Port Vila, Vanuatu, in 
2008. The reasons that are often given for the creation of the msg were 
political, especially in relation to Melanesian leaders’ frustrations over 
what they saw as the region’s indecisiveness on issues such as the decolo-
nization of New Caledonia (Lawson 2013; Grynberg and Kabutaulaka 
1995; MacQueen 1989). Ron May asserted that “the msg had its origins 
in a broad sense of Melanesian cultural solidarity and a desire to assert a 
Melanesian voice among the members of the Pacific Islands Forum, which 
some island countries perceived to be dominated by Australia and New 
Zealand” (2011, 6). 
However, beyond these publicly expressed views, another reason for 
the establishment of the msg was Melanesian leaders’ concerns about the 
sense of superiority and domination that Polynesian leaders exerted at the 
regional level in the years after independence (MacQueen 1989). There 
were feelings that in the early days of Pacific Islands regionalism, Mela-
nesians were looked down on. At that time, as noted earlier, this included 
dialogue • kabutaulaka 129
Fiji under Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, who came from Lau and had close 
connections with Tonga and Sāmoa. This was demonstrated, among other 
incidents, by Ratu Mara’s opposition to Papua New Guinea’s inclusion in 
the South Pacific Forum (later renamed the Pacific Islands Forum) during 
its inaugural meeting in Wellington in 1971. He was also opposed to the 
nomination of a PNG national, Oala Rarua, for the position of secre-
tary-general of the South Pacific Commission (later renamed the Pacific 
Community) (see Lawson 2013, 10). Furthermore, there were perceptions 
among Melanesian leaders that the concept of the Pacific Way as articu-
lated by Ratu Mara, while pretending to be inclusive of the region, actu-
ally marginalized Melanesia and privileged Polynesian values, especially 
aristocratic leadership systems (Lawson 2013, 8–12). 
Consequently, Fiji was not part of the initial discussions and did not 
become a member of the msg until 1996. According to former Fiji Prime 
Minister Sitiveni Rabuka, “Fiji was not part of the initial group that joined 
the msg because at that time Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara was regarded as one 
of the founding members of the Pacific Islands Forum with Australia and 
New Zealand so it would have appeared like Fiji was deserting the rest of 
the Pacific and going with the rest of the Western group, or Melanesian 
group” (Islands Business 2013). In spite of this, Fiji is now embraced as 
an important member of the msg.
Today, the msg has emerged as a political and economic force in the 
region. It has “expanded its purview to include climate change and secu-
rity, and is leading the process of regional economic integration” (Tarte 
2014, 312). Fijian academic Wadan Narsey described the msg as “the 
Western Pacific Powerhouse”:
the msg offers very real and significant economic benefits to the Melanesian 
countries, and especially Fiji, Vanuatu, and Solomon Islands, who can work 
linkages with the new found minerals, lng [liquified natural gas] wealth and 
booming economic growth of PNG. The msg may well expand to include 
West Papua and flnks (Kanaky New Caledonia) both also resource rich, and 
both of whom will at long last find the regional support for their independence 
struggles, long denied them by [the] Forum Secretariat. Should Timor Leste 
also be included in the future, the msg will be even further strengthened as the 
most powerful regional integration movement, totally overshadowing the eco-
nomic possibilities from the Pacific Plan [a strategy for Pacific-wide regional 
cooperation endorsed by leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum in 2005]. There 
is also every likelihood that the resource rich msg has far more complementary 
benefits to offer the atoll countries (Kiribati, Tuvalu, FSM etc) than the Eastern 
Polynesian countries. (Narsey 2013)10
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In March 2013, the University of the South Pacific, in collaboration 
with the Government of Fiji, hosted a “Melanesian Week” to mark the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group. The celebrations were laced with the theme “Celebrating Mela-
nesian Solidarity and Growth.” In his address, usp Vice Chancellor and 
President Rajesh Chandra pointed to the fact that the three msg countries 
that are usp members—Fiji, Vanuatu, and Solomon Islands—accounted 
for 82 percent of the university’s enrollment in 2012 and that the sub-
region “represents most of the population of our region, and its largest 
economies. msg has given a stronger voice to the 90% of Pacific island-
ers that it represents. It embodies the spirit of Pacific pride and honour, 
and is a positive, complementary organization to the pifs [Pacific Islands 
Forum Secretariat] framework, and contributes to maintaining the bal-
ance between metropolitan powers and smaller Pacific island nations” 
(msg 2013). 
The msg countries’ potential for economic development contributes to 
their rising political power in the region. As Ron May stated, “In terms 
of population, land and resources, the Melanesian countries—particularly 
Papua New Guinea—are the dominant forces in Pacific island politics and 
economics, and have been largely responsible over recent years for the 
growing Chinese and European interest in the Pacific” (May 2011, 1).11 
As a block, the msg is already beginning to make its weight felt in regional 
politics, especially in countering the influence of Australia and New Zea-
land. This was vividly demonstrated when the msg continued to support 
Fiji following its suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum and the Com-
monwealth and received “diplomatic cold shoulders” and sanctions from 
Australia, New Zealand, and the European Union following the 2006 
coup. In 2011, defying pressure from Australia and New Zealand, the 
msg elected Fiji’s coup leader and interim prime minister, Commodore 
Frank Bainimarama, as chair of the subregional organization. This poured 
cold water on Australian and New Zealand attempts to use the Pacific 
Islands Forum to turn up the heat on Fiji. Papua New Guinea’s foreign 
affairs minister told the 18th msg Summit held in Fiji in March 2011: “We 
must never lose sight of the fact that the msg is a regional organization 
that consists of nations who are an integral part of the Pacific. We also 
have an international persona that cannot be subjected to the dictates of 
nor subjected by instructional decisions of anybody or entity whether they 
be regional or international, including the Pacific Islands Forum and the 
Commonwealth” (Loanakadavu 2011).
The msg is the political and economic manifestation of the idea of 
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“Melanesia” and the assertion of Melanesianism. It is the body in which 
this “imagined community” becomes “real.”
Wantokism
Wantokism is reinforced by a common pidgin language. The Melanesian 
subregion has a high “language density” with about 1,319 languages 
(Landweer and Unseth 2012).12 But Melanesia also constitutes the largest 
population in Oceania—a little over eight million people—who speak a 
common language other than English. Although there are slight differ-
ences between PNG tok pisin, Vanuatu bislama, and Solomon Islands 
pijin, the people of these countries can carry on conversations entirely 
in pidgin. This is empowering and marks the pidgin-speaking Melane-
sian countries as wantok countries. Although Fijians do not speak pidgin, 
their interactions with other Melanesian countries through the Melane-
sian Spearhead Group have made them increasingly part of the wantok 
community. New Caledonia has long been viewed as part of the wantok 
community, although the Kanaks speak French, rather than pidgin. 
This raises the importance of the concept of the wantok system or 
 “wantokism.” Some scholars have often identified this as a factor con-
tributing to poor governance and economic mismanagement. Francis 
Fukuyama, for example, in writing about post-conflict and development 
challenges in Solomon Islands, argued that wantokism is one of the major 
obstacles to post-conflict development in Solomon Islands (2008).  Morgan 
Brigg, however, argued in favor of “the innovative possibility of draw-
ing on wantokism as a culturally recognised and valuable resource for 
addressing the current challenges faced by Solomon Islands” (2009, 148). 
Brigg suggested that wantokism could be used to mobilize locally emerg-
ing national identities, that it does not necessarily drive corruption, and 
that it could be utilized to facilitated governance at the local level. Gor-
don Nanau also discussed how the wantok system could potentially be an 
important network that enhances relationships both within and between 
countries (2011). Wantokism or the wantok system could therefore be the 
foundation on which Melanesianism thrives. 
Melanusic
“Traditional” and popular cultures are often used to reaffirm the idea of 
Melanesia. This is best demonstrated through the Melanesian Festival of 
Arts and Culture, a biannual event that started in 1998 and includes “tra-
ditional” and contemporary cultural and artistic expressions that assert 
and celebrate the idea of Melanesia. The 5th Melanesian Festival of Arts 
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and Culture was held in Port Moresby from 30 June to 31 July 2014 
and had the theme “Celebrating Cultural Diversity.” This reaffirmed the 
notion of “unity in diversity” that I mentioned earlier. 
Music is another medium through which Melanesianism is often 
expressed and reaffirmed. Contemporary Melanesian music combines ele-
ments of indigenous musical styles with popular musical genres like reg-
gae, hip-hop, folk, and rock that have their origins elsewhere. It is the 
Melanesianization of global music genres, similar to what Kalissa Alex-
eyeff has observed in the Cook Islands (2004). 
To illustrate this, let me refer to a few songs from Melanesian bands. 
The PNG band Haos Boi has a song titled “Melanesia,” with lyrics about 
“living in paradise on this land I’ll never give away” and about going to 
other places and realizing that there is no place like PNG in Melanesia. 
The lyrics also affirm the values of Melanesian cultures and tubuna pasin 
(ways of the elders) (Haus Boi 2009). Popular US-based Papua New Guin-
ean–American musician Oshen (Jason Hershey), in his song also titled 
“Melanesia,” sings about “Melanesia my Pacific Islands paradise.”13 The 
lyrics combine PNG tok pisin and English and reflect the musician’s expe-
riences growing up in Papua New Guinea and valuing his connections with 
Melanesia (Oshen 2009). Fijian musician Jale Maraeau also celebrates his 
Melanesian connections with his song “Melanesia,” which he sings in the 
Fijian language (Maraeau 2010). A Solomon Islands band called Onetox 
(which is a play on the term wantok and the concept of wantokism), pop-
ular in Melanesia and Micronesia, celebrates the idea of Melanesia and 
reaffirms Melanesianism. Melanesian musicians have popularized pidgin, 
creating awareness about Melanesia in ways that transcend the negative 
representations. They also reach out to younger people who might have 
never read academic papers. Nowadays, Melanesian musicians are also 
using audiovisual technology and the Internet—especially YouTube and 
websites such as Papua New Guinea’s  www.CHMSupersound.com—to 
promote their music and positive images of both Melanesia as a place and 
Melanesians as peoples. 
Challenges
It would be remiss of me to leave the reader thinking that Melanesia and 
Melanesianism are unproblematic. Melanesian places face enormous 
social, political, and economic challenges, and Melanesianism continues 
to be contested, discussed, and changed. 
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In spite of their resource endowment, Melanesian countries (espe-
cially Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands) lag behind in social and 
 economic development and are unlikely to meet their commitments under 
the Millennium Development Goals. The countries suffer from economic 
mismanagement and weak governance. In the last three decades, Mela-
nesia was the site of some of the most violent conflicts that the Pacific 
Islands region has seen since World War II. These include the violence 
associated with the demands for decolonization in New Caledonia in 
the 1980s (Chappell 2013); the Bougainville crisis (Regan 1998); the Fiji 
coups (Tarte 2006); the Solomon Islands conflicts (Moore 2004); and the 
ongoing violence associated with the demands for independence in West 
Papua (King 2004). The law and order problems in Papua New Guinea 
are real and affect social and economic development (Dinnen 2001). 
Apart from that, Melanesian unity has, in recent years, been tested by 
disagreements between countries on various issues.14 In late 2010, a row 
between Fiji and Vanuatu ensued after the then Vanuatu prime minis-
ter, Edward Natapei, refused to give up the msg chairmanship to the Fiji 
prime minister and coup leader, Commodore Frank Bainimarama, argu-
ing that “there are basic fundamental principles and values of democracy 
and good governance that our organisation is built on, and we must con-
tinue to uphold them” (Radio Australia, 13 July 2010). The issue was 
resolved after a change of government in Vanuatu and the election of Sato 
Kilman as prime minister; reconciliation between Fiji and Vanuatu took 
place in December 2010, sponsored by Solomon Islands. Bainimarama 
subsequently became msg chair (Solomon Times Online 2010). In another 
incident, Fiji expressed disappointment with Papua New Guinea after the 
election of a PNG national, Meg Taylor, as secretary-general of the Pacific 
Islands Forum Secretariat during the Forum meeting in Palau in late July–
early August 2014. On 4 August 2014, the Fiji Sun published a front-
page article titled, “Back Stabbed: PNG Betrays Fiji, msg, and Derails 
Agreement to Back Tavola for Top Regional Job” (Delaibatiki 2014). The 
article argues that Papua New Guinea had reneged on an msg agreement 
to support a Fijian, Kaliopate Tavola, for the position. The three finalists 
for the position—Meg Taylor (PNG), Kaliopate Tavola (Fiji), and Jimmie 
Rodgers (Solomon Islands)—were all from msg countries. The third inci-
dent was the civil aviation row between Fiji and Solomon Islands that saw 
the two countries suspending rights for each other’s national carriers—
Fiji Airways and Solomon Airlines—to land in their respective countries 
(Pareti 2014a).15 
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The issue of West Papua has been a difficult one for the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group. While Vanuatu has been consistent in its support for 
West Papuan independence, the other msg countries insisted that it is an 
issue for Indonesia to resolve and have expressed their respect for Indo-
nesian sovereignty. In July 2014, a membership application by the West 
Papua pro-independence movement, the West Papua National Coalition 
for Liberation, to join the msg was blocked because msg leaders asked 
for a more representative bid from West Papua. The issue has also caused 
tension among the msg members because of the increasing influence of 
Indonesia, which was admitted as an msg observer during Fiji’s tenure as 
msg chair (Pareti 2014b). 
Such incidents could be perceived as evidence of Melanesian disunity, 
suggesting therefore that Melanesianism is a social and political façade 
and that the “imagined Melanesian community” is simply that—imag-
ined. I would argue, however, that such incidents do not necessarily imply 
disunity or the absence of Melanesianism. Rather, they demonstrate the 
continuing discourse (tok stori) that embodies the idea of Melanesia and 
are part of the process of appropriating and owning the term “Melanesia” 
and asserting Melanesianism. 
Conclusions
The early European mapping of Oceania, especially the tripartite division 
into Polynesia, Micronesia, and Melanesia, was fraught with essential-
ist, racist, and social-evolutionary elements. For centuries, Melanesia and 
Melanesians were generally represented in negative and derogatory ways 
in scholarly and popular discourses. That perspective has, to some extent, 
been internalized by Pacific Islanders, including Melanesians. It has also 
influenced contemporary representations of and relationships with Mela-
nesia and Melanesians.
However, since the 1970s, Melanesians have appropriated the term 
“Melanesia” and used it for self-identification, turning it from a deroga-
tory term to a positive one: a source of pride and self-identification. They 
have appropriated a colonial concept and deployed it as an instrument of 
empowerment. Since the late 1980s, they have used it to mobilize through 
subregional organizations such as the Melanesian Spearhead Group and 
events such as the Melanesian Festival of Arts and Culture. This has 
enabled Melanesian countries to assert political and economic power in 
Oceania and to redefine and re-present themselves. 
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This has engendered “Melanesianism”—a process and a discourse (tok 
stori) that celebrates the idea of Melanesian. They have subsequently 
 created “alter-natives” who are clawing their way out of the “ignoble sav-
age” cocoon where they have been encased for centuries. Melane sians, 
armed with diverse and rich cultures, have captured the “ignoble savage,” 
turned it on its head, and used the term “Melanesia” to establish their 
place in Oceania and beyond, creating new and empowering images. 
Melanesians are asserting their “place in the sun in Oceania.”
* * *
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the “Pacific Alternatives: 
Cultural Heritage and Political Innovation in Oceania” conference held at the 
University of Hawai‘i–Mānoa (uhm), 24–27 March 2009. The conference was 
organized by the University of Bergen in Norway and the uhm Center for Pacific 
Islands Studies. The paper was also presented as a public lecture at the University 
of the South Pacific in Suva, Fiji, in June 2010. A version appears in Hviding and 
White forthcoming. I am thankful to Murray Chapman, Margaret Jolly, Christo-
pher Ballard, and David Chappell, all of whom provided invaluable critique and 
comments on earlier versions of this paper. However, as the author, I take full 
responsibility for any omissions, misrepresentations, and errors. 
Notes
1 Taken together, the four Melanesian countries and one territory—Papua 
New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, and New Caledonia—comprise 98 
percent of the total land area, 98 percent of land-based resources, 88 percent 
of the total population, and 28 percent of the total exclusive economic zones 
(spc 2014). (This does not include West Papua whose indigenous populations are 
Melanesians. This western half of the island of New Guinea is part of Indonesia, 
but there is an ongoing struggle for independence that has been taking place since 
the 1960s when the Indonesians took over the territory from the Dutch.) 
2 Here, the term “Melanesia” is used to refer to the islands in the southwest-
ern Pacific Ocean, consisting of the island of New Guinea—Papua New Guinea 
and West Papua—and its outlying islands; Solomon Islands; Vanuatu; Kanaky/
New Caledonia; and Fiji.
3 “Wantokism” is derived from the term wantok, which is pidgin for “one 
talk,” meaning people who speak the same language. It is also about relationships 
and looking after each other as people who are related through kinship, language, 
island, and region.
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4 The terms “Polynesia,” “Micronesia,” and “Melanesia” were derivatives 
of the Greek words poly (meaning “many”), micro (meaning “tiny” or “small”), 
and melos (meaning “black”). “Nesia” comes from the Greek word nesos, which 
means “islands.”
5 I am sure that if I had watched the documentary series Meet the Natives, it 
would have provided a close and useful reading and deconstruction of contempo-
rary European visions of Melanesia.
6 Wan solwara is a Papua New Guinea tok pisin (pidgin) term that literally 
means “one salt water” or “one ocean.” It is also the name of the newspaper 
 published by the journalism program at the University of the South Pacific, Suva, 
Fiji. The name is an attempt to create a sense of Oceanic identity among usp stu-
dents and faculty. 
7 Malama Meleisea used the term tama uli to refer to the descendants of 
 Melanesians who were taken to work in the plantations in Sāmoa in the late 
1800s and early 1900s (Meleisea 1980). This is seen as a more respectful way to 
refer to black people.
8 The “West Wind” poem was written to ridicule the demands for greater 
autonomy being made by the people of the Western Solomons, who believed they 
could achieve that through a federal system of government, or “state govern-
ment,” as it was commonly known in Solomon Islands at that time. The poem 
was therefore not primarily about race, although it made reference to race.
9 Melanesia is one of the most ethno-linguistically diverse places in Oceania 
and the world. As Tom Dutton stated, “Here, scattered across New Guinea, the 
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia, the Loyalty Islands and Fiji are to 
be found over one thousand languages, or approximately one-quarter of those 
spoken in the world today” (2006, 207). Papua New Guinea has about 800 lan-
guages, Solomon Islands 87, and Vanuatu 118.
10 While there is widespread support in the Pacific Islands Forum and the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group for an independence referendum in New Caledo-
nia, the case of West Papua has proven more complicated. In the past five years, 
Indonesia has increased its presence in the region and asserted pressure on the 
msg countries not to support West Papua independence. Vanuatu is the only 
country that has offered unwavering support for West Papuan independence.
11 Papua New Guinea’s growing power in the Pacific Islands region is evident 
through its increasing influence in the Pacific Islands Forum and its emergence as 
an aid donor to smaller Pacific Island countries, including those in Melanesia (see 
Hayward-Jones and Cain 2014).
12 “Language density” here refers to the number of languages in relation to 
land area. Lynn Landweer and Peter Unseth reported that there is a proportion of 
about 716 square kilometers per language in Melanesia, giving it the densest rate 
of languages in relation to land area on earth (2012). This is almost three times 
as dense as Nigeria, a country famous for the high number of languages per land 
area.
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13 Oshen is a US-based musician who was born of American missionary par-
ents and grew up in Papua New Guinea. He regularly visits Papua New Guinea 
and other Melanesian countries to seek inspiration for his music. He writes, per-
forms, and records songs in tok pisin and English. 
14 At the center of this is Fiji, a country entangled in the Melanesia/Poly-
nesia binary. More importantly, since 2009, Fiji’s regional and international 
diplomacy has been influenced by its attempts to reestablish its “legitimacy” 
following its marginalization from the Pacific Islands Forum as a result of the 
2006 coup.
15 By September 2014, when this paper was submitted, the civil aviation row 
between Fiji and Solomon Islands had not yet been resolved. There were calls for 
the prime ministers of the two countries to be involved to help resolve the impasse 
(rnzi 2014). This was, however, resolved in January 2015, allowing Fiji Airways 
and Solomon Airlines to resume flights to Honiara and Nadi (rnzi 2015).
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Abstract
In this essay, I examine the dominant representations of Melanesia as a place 
and Melanesians as peoples and how these have influenced understandings of 
and responses to contemporary developments in this subregion. I begin with an 
overview of the discourses that influenced the mapping of Oceania and the nega-
tive representations of Melanesians. These have, in turn, framed and influenced 
discourses about and relationships with Melanesia and Melanesians, including 
Melanesian perceptions of themselves and their relationships with others. 
Against this background, my focus is on how Melanesians have recently appro-
priated the term “Melanesia” and are using it in positive, empowering, and pro-
gressive ways to mobilize, redefine, and re-present themselves. In the process, they 
have constructed a pan-Melanesian identity that embraces and celebrates the sub-
region’s ethno-linguistic and cultural diversities. This is manifested through the 
concepts of “the Melanesian Way” and “wantokism,” intergovernmental organi-
zations such as the Melanesian Spearhead Group, the arts, and popular culture. 
Through all of these, Melanesians are “altering” the native and “re-presenting” 
what might be called the “ignoble savage.” This process and discourse constitute 
“Melanesianism.”
keywords: Solomon Islands, Melanesia, Melanesian Spearhead Group, the Mel-
anesian way, representation, culture areas, wantokism
